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INTRODUCTION

The consumer demand for beer produced by small, independent
breweries has proven to be more than a fleeting trend. The consumer market
for craft beer in South Carolina, and indeed all over the country, continues to
grow and chip away at the market dominance of domestic (but non-craft)
beer.' While in many ways a late arrival to the recent explosion in the
industry, South Carolina is now home to seventy-seven breweries and
nineteen brewpubs,2 which together boasted an estimated $650 million

1.
See 2016 Brewery Statistics Now Available, BREWERS Ass'N, https://www.brewers
association.org/news/2016-brewery-statistics-now-available/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018). Craft
beer represented 12.3% of the market share of all beer purchased in the United States in 2016 and
only 5.7% of the market five years earlier. See 2015 Beer Data Infograph, BREWERS Ass'N,
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/2015-craft-beer-data-infographic/ (last visited
Mar. 26, 2018).
2.
See Brewery Directory, BREWERS Ass'N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/
directories/breweries/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
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economic impact on the state last year.3 In response to consumer trends,
South Carolina lawmakers have taken steps to ease the regulatory burdens
on the craft beer industry, recently passing laws that allow producers of beer
to sell on-site food, 4 to sell beer directly to consumers,5 to apply for liquor
licenses under certain parameters, 6 and to make donations to nonprofit
organizations that have special event permits.7 Despite these recent changes,
many of the laws and regulations that govern the craft beer industry in South
Carolina remain entrenched in the past, surviving as relics of the prohibition
era.8 While some near century-old alcohol laws serve vital purposes for
small, independent businesses in the modem craft beer industry albeit
likely not the purposes their original proponents imagined a handful of
laws persist in the South Carolina Code and in the daily lives of people in
the craft beer industry, despite serving purposes that no longer reflect
societal sentiments or address industry needs.
One preliminary issue that merits addressing is the definition of the
designation "craft brewery." While this is an ongoing, interesting, and often
highly-contentious debate, it remains outside the scope of this Note. For the
purposes of this Note, I have adopted the Brewers Association's definition
of a craft brewer: for a brewery to be categorized as a craft producer, it must
be small, 9 independent,' 0 and traditional."
This Note will focus on the laws and regulations, both within and
outside the three-tier system framework, that have a negative effect on craft
brewers in the state and stand as hindrances to an industry that has exploded
in South Carolina despite them. Additionally, this Note will compare the

3.
See South Carolina CraftBeer Sales Statistics, 2016, BREWERS Ass'N, https://www
.brewersassociation.org/statistics/by-state/?state=SC (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) [hereinafter
S.C. 2016 Statistics].
4.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(B)(1) (Supp. 2014).
5.
See id. § 61-4-1515(A).
6.
See id. § 61-4-1515(B)(2).
7.
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-2-185 (Supp. 2017).
8. For a historical discussion approaching the topic nationally, see generally GLEN
WHITMAN, STRANGE BREW: ALCOHOL AND GOVERNMENT MONOPOLY (2003). For a South
Carolina-specific discussion on the antiquated nature of alcohol regulation, see JOHN D.
GEATHERS & JUSTIN R. WERNER, THE REGULATION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES IN SOUTH
CAROLINA (2007) [hereinafter THE GEATHERS' TREATISE].
9.
See CraftBrewer Defined, BREWERS Ass'N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/st

atistics/craft-brewer-defined/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) ("Annual production of 6 million
barrels of beer or less (approximately 3 percent of U.S. annual sales).").
10. See id. ("Less than 25 percent of the craft brewery is owned or controlled (or
equivalent economic interest) by an alcohol industry member that is not itself a craft brewer.").
11. See id. ("A brewer that has a majority of its total beverage alcohol volume in beers
whose flavor derives from traditional or innovative brewing ingredients and their
fermentation.").
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laws and regulations affecting craft beer in South Carolina with those of
similarly situated states, namely North Carolina and Georgia. Our federalistminded founders envisioned individual states as breeding grounds for
progressive experimentation that would serve to inspire and propel forward
other states, in turn bettering the collective nation. 12 To that optimistic end,
this Note will analyze the ways in which North Carolina and Georgia, states
that are geographically similar to South Carolina and had nearly identical
laws regulating beer before the arrival of "the craft beer revolution," have
met the relatively recent explosion of the industry. Since each state met the
change in market demand on a nearly equal legal footing, subsequent
changes to each state's regulation scheme provide useful comparisons for
their respective effects on the industry. Further, this Note will expound upon
a few other state policies around the nation, unique in their progressive
approaches to fostering success in the craft beer industry.
To promote further growth in the burgeoning craft beer industry and to
ensure a legal environment in which brewers can successfully pursue their
craft, South Carolina should ensure that current laws: (1) properly reflect
current societal goals with respect to modem attitudes on beer; and (2)
properly address the current needs of those in the industry. Specifically,
South Carolina should revise its laws to provide exceptions to the traditional
regulatory framework for small-scale producers, while continuing to
encourage fair market practices by limiting the influence and integration
ability of large-scale producers. To this end, South Carolina's changes to its
three-tiered framework should reflect the one initial purpose of the system
that remains applicable to modem society: promoting the independence of a
distribution tier that precludes the market domination of large-scale
producers, thereby ensuring fair competition among brewers in the
marketplace, both large and small. Additionally, South Carolina can
capitalize on the still-growing demand for craft beer, bringing money into
the state while being mindful of the small craft brewery business, by
providing meaningful tax credits to small-batch breweries, offering grants
that reward breweries for worthy efforts to promote tourism, and
restructuring antiquated laws that govern franchise agreements. State
lawmakers should look to how similarly situated states have reacted to the
market demand for craft beer, emulating practices of those that have
embraced change and noting the cautionary example of those states that
remain entrenched in the past.

12. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (commenting
that a "happy incident" of federalism allows states to serve as "laboratories" for "social and
economic experiments").
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THE REGULATION OF BEER IN SOUTH CAROLINA

While new consumer tastes for more flavorful and interesting beer have
propelled the recent growth of the craft industry, America's affinity for beer
is long-standing and well-documented.1 3 Cultural perceptions of beer,
however, have varied drastically.' 4 At the height of the temperance
movement, in early twentieth-century America, prohibitionists associated
beer with the moral pitfalls of the saloon, which connoted chronic
intemperance, sexual amorality, and poor character.'" Given the current
cultural climate and near-sanctification of beer as America's national
beverage, it's hard to believe that states ratified the Eighteenth Amendment,
which made illegal any sale of alcohol across the nation, less than a century
ago.1 6 While American sentiments disfavoring alcohol remained intact, the
nation soon realized that the prohibition experiment, while a noble one, was
failing.' 7 The legal framework that regulates the modem beer industry is a
direct result of the failure of the prohibition experiment, which occurred
among a societal climate that still associated alcohol with the evils of
intemperance.' 8 A nationwide ban on alcohol no longer a viable option, state
lawmakers implemented policies under the very same spirit that had helped
ratify the Eighteenth Amendment.
A.

The Three-Tier System

The repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, by way of the Twenty-First
Amendment, placed alcohol regulation once again under the purview of the

13. For a discussion of beer's origins in the United States, see GREGG SMITH, BEER IN
AMERICA: THE EARLY YEARS-1587-1840: BEER'S ROLE IN THE SETTLING OF AMERICA
AND THE BIRTH OF A NATION (1996). For a discussion on the solidification of beer as an
American beverage, see also Lisa Jacobson, Beer Goes to War: The PoliticsofBeer Promotion
and Production in the Second World War, 12 FOOD, CULTURE & Soc'Y 275, 275-312 (2009).
14. For a discussion on the competing interests and ideologies surrounding the
prohibition experiment, see generally DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF
PROHIBITION (2011).
15. See RAYMOND B. FOSDICK & ALBERT L. SCOTT, TOWARD LIQUOR CONTROL 10

(Ctr. for Alcohol Pol'y 2011) (1933) ("The saloon, as it existed in pre-prohibition days, was a
menace to society and must never be allowed to return.").
16. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 ("After one year from the ratification of this
article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited."), repealed by U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI.
17. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Forewordto FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 15, at xiii.
18. See Jim Petro et al., Introduction to FOSDICK& SCOTT, supra note 15, at vi.
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states.' 9 John D. Rockefeller, Jr., among the nation's most influential
proponents of alcohol abstinence, funded a study in an attempt to solve the
nation's intemperance problem, the result of which has "done more to shape
modem American alcohol policy than any other book except the Bible." 20 In
Toward Liquor Control, the aforementioned result of Rockefeller's study,
lawyer Raymond B. Fosdick and engineer Albert L. Scott advocated for
extensive state regulation of alcohol with the stated goals of (1) curbing the
amoral effects of alcohol; and (2) eliminating the restraints on the free
market caused by the undue influence of large-scale producers over smallscale retailers as well as the industry's affiliation with crime networks. 21 The
solution was the aptly-named "three-tier system." 22 While the system has
evolved significantly, developing a seemingly myriad array of complexities
since its conception, its central tenet remains simple. At its core, the system
mandates that each stage of the supply chain remain separate and
independent, thus creating three distinct tiers: the production tier, the
distribution tier, and the retail tier.23 In addition to prohibiting the
concentration of power and influence among large-scale producers, the
three-tier system also promised the effect of promoting temperance, thereby
quelling the amoral societal effects of overconsumption. 24 Courts have often
noted the prevailing influence of temperance as a motivation when analyzing
the three-tier system. 25
"Tied houses" were one such post-prohibition concern that exemplified
all the amoral associations alcohol held among the public and motivated
advocates of the three-tier system. 26 A tied house referred to a retailer

19. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXI, § 2 ("The transportation or importation into any state,
territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors,
in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.").
20. Jim Petro et al., supra note 18, at vii.
21. See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 9-11 (establishing the goals of state
regulation, including eliminating the illegal activities that dominated the prohibition-era black
market for alcohol, ensuring the non-return of the pre-prohibition saloon, and limiting the
influence of large liquor producers).
22. See id. at 27-31 (detailing the "methods of license" states should enact).
23. See Marc Sorini, Understandingthe Three-Tier System: Its Impacts on U.S. Craft
Beer and You, CRAFT BEER (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.craftbeer.com/craft-beer-muses/threetier-system-impacts-craft-beer (providing a brief history of the three-tier system and general
overview of its operation).
24. See id.
25. See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 439 (1990); Arnold's Wines,
Inc. v. Boyle, 571 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2009).
26. See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 29 ("'Tied houses' should, therefore, be
prohibited, and every opportunity for evasion of this system should, if possible, be foreseen
and blocked.").
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(usually a saloon) that was owned, at least in part, by a producer who was
usually affiliated with organized crime.2 7 As a result, the retailer sold only
the producer's product and free competition was stifled.28 Tied houses
represented one of the many amoral effects of alcohol that new state
regulation would be structured to prevent. Those almost century-old
motivations established the legal framework for the regulation of the
production, distribution, and sale of alcohol that remains in place today.
Much academic discussion has centered on the three-tier system, which
now exists in nearly every state and mandates the divorcement of
production, distribution, and retail operations. 29 Nearly every law and
regulation that governs the beer industry in South Carolina operates within
the three-tiered framework 30 : the producers of the beer make up one tier;
distributors (often called "wholesalers") make up the second tier; and
retailers who sell beer to the consumer make up the third. 31 Generally, states
enforce the system by requiring a business in the alcohol industry to obtain a
license for its desired tier and prohibiting any business from having licenses
across tiers. Thus, within the three-tier system, as a practical matter, alcohol
is produced only by licensed producers, distributed only by licensed
distributors, and then sold to consumers only by licensed retailers. Despite
challenges to the three-tier system's validity under the Commerce Clause,
the Supreme Court has found the regulatory framework to be
"unquestionably legitimate."32
South Carolina enforces its three-tier system as most states do: laws
requiring separate licenses for producers, distributors, and retailers. 33 South
Carolina followed the majority of states, adopting Fosdick and Scott's plan
for alcohol regulation shortly after the ratification of the Twenty-First

27. See id.
28. See Lindsey A. Zahn, Is There a Future for the Three-Tier Alcohol Beverage
Distribution System?, ON RESERVE (July 28, 2010), https://www.winelawonreserve.com/2010
/07/28/is-there-a-future-for-the-three-tier-alcoholic-beverage-distribution-system/ (describing the
chilling effect of the three-tier system on competition within the wine industry in particular).
29. See Sorini, supra note 23.
30. But see infra Section II.C (discussing the brewpub designation as existing outside
the confines of the three-tier system).
31. See Sorini, supra note 23 (providing a general overview of the three-tier system's
operation).
32. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 489 (2005) (holding that New York and
Michigan laws, which permitted in-state wineries to ship wine to consumers, but prohibited
out-of-state wineries from doing the same, violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution
under the doctrine of the "dormant commerce clause").
33. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-940 (2009).
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Amendment. 34 As is the case in most states, the system in South Carolina
provides the basis for state alcohol regulation; it affects, and is affected by,
nearly any change in the law. By way of enforcement, laws mandate that any
business in the industry apply to the South Carolina Department of Revenue
(DOR) for a permit to enter a desired tier. 35 The DOR has, on many
occasions, denied the applications of businesses that try to operate on
multiple tiers. 36

The most tangible and obvious effect of the divorcement of tiers in the
craft beer industry is that breweries may not self-distribute. Rather, a
producer is legally obligated to go through a distributor to get its product to
market. That prevailing effect of the system, however, tends not to plague
South Carolina brewers, who prefer to contract out distribution since selfdistribution would likely not be economically feasible for small-scale
brewers. 37 Edward Westbrook, co-founder of Westbrook Brewing Company,
indicated that his disinterest in self-distribution reflects a common sentiment
among all small brewers in South Carolina. 38 Aside from economic
infeasibility, brewers have other reasons to favor independent distribution
over self-distribution. The National Beer Wholesalers Association notes that
the existence of an independent distribution tier results in economic
efficiencies by way of fewer direct connections between the first and third
tiers. 39 While the exact effects are disputed, independent distribution
provides, at minimum, a wider market range of distribution for small
breweries. 40 Westbrook Brewing, for example, remains a (relatively) small
brewing operation but is nonetheless able to distribute beer to markets as

34. See History, S.C. BEER WHOLESALERS Ass'N, https://www.scbwa.com/about-us
(last visited Sept. 30, 2017); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-940 (2009).
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-310(A) (2009).
36. See, e.g., infra Section II.C (discussing DOR's denial of a permit application by
Hunter-Gatherer, LLC).
37. Interview with Edward Westbrook, Founder, Westbrook Brewery, in Mount
Pleasant, S.C. (Nov. 2, 2017) [hereinafter Westbrook Interview] ("I think unless you're talking
about one of the massive producers, craft brewers couldn't afford to self-distribute anyways. I
also see where [self-distribution] could also be an attractive option for smaller, hyper local
breweries.").
38. Id. ("Not only is self-distribution not a priority for us, it wouldn't be feasible. Small
brewers recognize it wouldn't be feasible economically . .. Wholesalers also provide a service
that [small South Carolina brewers] couldn't focus properly on and couldn't do a good job at
[compared to the job our distributors do].").
39. See WILLIAM LANTHAM & KENNETH LEWIS, NAT'L BEER WHOLESALERS Ass'N,
&

AMERICA'S BEER DISTRIBUTORS: FUELING JOBS, GENERATING ECONOMIC GROWTH
DELIVERING VALUE TO LOCAL COMMUNITIES 8 (2013), http://nbwa.org/sites/default/files/
NBWA-Economic-Report-20 13 .pdf [hereinafter NBWA ECONOMIC REPORT].

40. See id. at 12 ("Small brewers are able to reach wider markets through the access
distributors provide so that consumers have more choice.").
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distant as New York and California. 41 That wide distribution range would
likely not be possible for small producers that attempted to self-distribute.
While some of the criticism directed towards the system is wellfounded, the three-tiered framework in South Carolina very likely has a net
positive effect on the craft beer industry. While large-scale production
companies, like AB InBev,4 2 dominate several aspects of the market,
including advertising, sponsorship, and sales, 43 the three-tier system allows

for an independent distribution tier to mitigate the influence that megaproducers could exercise over retailers. The second tier of the industry acts
as a buffer between producer and retailer; without it, the process could be
streamlined, and large-scale producers would be able to exert direct
influence on retailers, who might receive benefits for exclusively supplying
certain brands, for example. The Brewers Association, as well as local South
Carolina brewers, 44 note the importance of the independent second tier:
The [Brewers Association] supports the independence of
wholesalers and believes independent wholesalers are wholesalers
who are contractually and economically free to allocate their efforts
among the brands they sell without the undue influence of their
largest suppliers. Each brand gets the attention it deserves on its
own merits in the marketplace. 45
While some outdated aspects of the three-tier system place hindrances
on the craft beer industry in South Carolina, its central tenet, the
divorcement of producer and retailer by way of an independent second tier,

41. Westbrook Interview, supra note 37.
42. After acquiring SAB Miller in 2015 for $106 billion, AB InBev's share of the global
beer market jumped to an estimated twenty-eight percent. See Michael J. de la Merced,
Anheuser-Busch InBev Merger With SABMiller Wins U.S. Antitrust Approval, N.Y. TIMES
(July 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/21/business/dealbook/anheuser-busch-mill
er-merger-wins-us-antitrust-approval.html.
43. See AB INBEV, ANNUAL REPORT 2016, at 24 (2016), http://www.ab-inbev.com/con
tent/dam/universaltemplate/ab-inbev/investors/reports-and-filings/annual-and-hy-reports/2017/
03/AB%/`20InBev%/`20Annual%/`2OReport%/`202016%/20-%/`20Financial%/`20report.pdf (reporting
over $7 billion on marketing expenses and over $45 billion in revenue for 2016).
44. Westbrook Interview, supra note 37 (discussing, at length, the vital role of an
independent distribution tier in prohibiting market domination by mega-brewers: "[The
distribution tier] insulates the smaller brewers and protects us from the big guys. An
independent middle tier helps to keep the big guys in check it protects everyone else in the
retail and consumer tier from being dominated by the conglomerates").
45. Government Affairs, BA Position Statements, BREWERS Ass'N, https://www.brewer
sassociation.org/government-affairs/ba-position-statements/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2018).
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remains the craft industry's strongest defense against an oligopoly in which
three or four producers would stand to lay claim over the entire beer market.
As discussed supra, one of Fosdick and Scott's primary goals in
establishing a system of post-prohibition alcohol regulation was to
extinguish the prevailing influence of "tied houses" on the alcohol
industry. 46 When the majority of states adopted Fosdick and Scott's threetier system of alcohol regulation, most did so with an explicit tied-house
statute, and South Carolina was no exception.47 South Carolina's tied-house
statute is characteristically succinct and explicit: "A person or an entity in
the beer business on one tier, or a person acting directly or indirectly on his
behalf, may not have ownership or financial interest in the beer business
operation on another tier." 48 Despite the statute's seemingly iron-clad
rigidity, business owners in South Carolina have found a way to
simultaneously own production and retail operations, by way of the brewpub
exception, discussed in depth infra.49 However, the utilization of that
exception for the purpose of circumventing the tied-house statute can have
significant negative effects, also discussed infra.5 0
B. FranchiseLaws

'

While not products of the prohibition-era temperance movement, beer
franchise laws no longer reflect the attitudes and needs of the craft beer
industry and remain a common source of complaints among brewers. 5
Operating within the three-tier system, franchise laws, enacted in the 1970s,
govern contract agreements between those on the production tier and their
distributors. 52 The laws strictly regulate all contracts between brewer and
distributor and serve to heavily tip the bargaining power scale in favor of the

46. See FOSDICK & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 29 (."Tied houses' should, therefore, be
prohibited, and every opportunity for evasion of this system should, if possible, be foreseen
and blocked.").
47. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-940(D) (Supp. 2014).
48. Id.
49. See discussion infra Section II.C (discussing the brewpub designation as an
exception to the three-tier system).
50. See discussion infra Section II.C (noting the difficult decisions brewpub owners
face, in light of recent changes to the law and South Carolina's tied-house statute).
51. See, e.g., Steve Hindy, Free Craft Beer!, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2014), https://
www.nytimes.com/2014/03/30/opinion/sunday/free-craft-beer.html?_r=1 (explaining brewers'
common complaints in regards to state franchise laws).
52. See Marc E. Sorini, Beer Franchise Law Summary, COUNS. FOR THE BREWERS
Ass'N (2014), https://s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/brewersassoc/wp-content/uploads/2017/04
/Beer-Franchise-Law-Summary.pdf.
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distributor.5 3 Beer franchise laws continue to govern contracts between
producer and distributor in some form or another in a majority of states.
South Carolina passed its own franchise laws in 1976,54 at a time when
industry dynamics provided some justification for the laws. Then, over 5,000
distributors in the United States competed for the business of only fifty
breweries.5 5 Large-scale breweries had a significant bargaining power
advantage over considerably smaller distributors. 56 Imagine the common
scenario in which a small distributor's entire business hinged on a single
contract with a major brewer. If after the distributor had invested heavily in
refrigerated trucks, warehouses, and a varied staff, the bottom-line-minded
large-scale brewer cancelled the contract to pursue a more favorable
agreement the distributor was left out to dry. Thus, states passed franchise
laws in an effort to place producers and distributors on an equal footing.57
As is the case with most alcohol regulation, temperance was also a
motivating factor.5 1

Today, industry numbers do not reflect the same need for a check on the
bargaining power of small-scale producers: in 2014, fewer than 1,000 viable
national distributors served more than 2,700 breweries. 59 While large-scale
producers still have a bargaining advantage over small distributors for the
reasons outlined above, the majority of producers are small and independent
with no greater bargaining power than an independent distributor. While
franchise laws provide a justified power check for contracts of unequal
bargaining power, i.e., those between independent distributors and largescale producers, the laws serve no material purpose in contracts between
parties on an equal footing, i.e., distributors and small-scale producers. The
mere plain language of South Carolina's franchise statute hints at the law's
underlying bias against all producers: "It is unlawful for a producer . .. to
coerce, attempt to coerce, or persuade [a distributor] to enter into an

53. See id.
54. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1100 (2012) (previously codified as S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 61-9-1010 (1976)).
55. See Sorini, supra note 52 (detailing how most states have enacted at least a few laws
that regulate brewer-wholesaler relations as opposed to before these laws, where the relations
were governed exclusively by the terms of the parties' contract).
56. See id.
57. See id. ("Although it is not hard to detect a whiff of protectionism in these
enactments, their stated purpose is to correct the perceived imbalance in bargaining power
between brewers (who are presumed to be big and rich) and wholesalers (who are presumed to
be small and local).").
58. See id. ("Temperance concerns are also cited.").
59. See Hindy, supranote 51.
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agreement to take any action which would violate a provision of this
article .... "60

While South Carolina craft brewers have acknowledged the benefits of
recent changes to South Carolina's beer laws, 61 considerable concerns still
exist over franchise laws. Franchise laws vary from state to state, 62 and
South Carolina's are among the nation's most restrictive. In South Carolina,
a contract between producer and distributor cannot be terminated by either
side without giving the other sixty days' notice in writing. 63 Further, the
written notice must include:
(i) assurance that the agreement or contract, written or oral,
franchise, or contractual franchise relationship is being terminated
in good faith and for material violation of one or more provisions
which are relevant to the effective operation of the agreement or
contract, written or oral, franchise, or contractual franchise
relationship, if any, and (ii) a list of the specific reasons for the
termination or cancellation.64
In addition to the good faith and material violation requirements, the
laws state that neither party can cancel the contract "without due regard to
the equities of the [other party] or without just cause or provocation. "65
These laws govern producer-distributor agreements even when the contract
is assigned to a different party. 66
South Carolina's beer franchise laws have the strange effect of keeping
a producer and distributor in contract, whether either wants to continue
business with the other or not, and only allowing for the termination of a
contractual relationship upon a good faith showing of a material violation of
the agreement. The incentive structure favors a race-to-the-bottom
relationship, in which neither party is motivated to act to the benefit of the
other. 67 With these laws in place, distributors could fall short of providing
services that are important to brewers, while not performing poorly enough
to satisfy a court's definition of committing a material violation: failing to

60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1 100(1)(a) (Supp. 2014).
61. See infra Section II.C.
62. See, e.g., infra Section III.A (discussing the nuances between franchise laws in
South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia).
63. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1100(1)(b) (Supp. 2014).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1115 (Supp. 2014).
67. See Hindy, supra note 51.
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keep the beer cold at all times, for example. 68 More instinctively, these laws
ignore the human element of conducting business: brewers and distributors
who simply do not get along well with one another are stuck in a contractual
relationship. Additionally, small brewers often find themselves with no
recourse when stuck in a contract with a distributor, even if the distributor
has committed material violations, because the small brewer does not have
the money to sue. 69

Edward Westbrook, while acknowledging his company's good fortune
in having a great relationship with an effective distributor, noted that a bad
relationship with a distributor could mean the death of a small brewery that
lacks the means to cancel the franchise contract. 70 Larger breweries, like
Brooklyn Brewery in New York and Dogfish Head in Delaware, for
example, have expended as much as $300,000 in legal costs and fees to
cancel contracts with distributors. 7 ' It stands to reason that smaller breweries
could not endure a legal battle so costly. According to economist Jacob
Burgdorf, franchise laws in the South Carolina beer industry have
"encouraged opportunism by [distributors] and increased costs to brewers as
these laws decreased craft brewery entry and production and increased
prices." 72 Foundationally, the laws place a significant limitation on
producers' and distributors' right to contract by (1) limiting a party's ability
to terminate to situations in which the other party has committed material
malfeasance; and (2) mandating an exclusive remedy that is costly and
inefficient.73

Aside from mandating certain unwaivable contract terms, state franchise
laws also typically include provisions which grant distributors the exclusive
right to distribute a particular brand to a particular territory. These laws are
referred to as mandated exclusive territory laws. Mandated exclusive
territory laws place additional restraints on brewers' freedom of contract

68.
69.

See id.
See id.

70. Westbrook Interview, supra note 37 ("Yeah, one contract with a distributor can sink
a small brewery just starting out if things aren't working out. . . . Everyone [in the industry]
knows about instances of a brewery being stuck in a contract with no [economically feasible]
way out.").
71. See Hindy, supra note 5 1 (noting that Brooklyn Brewery, settling outside of court
after a months-long legal battle, had expended $300,000 to cancel a distributor contract, from a
dispute that arose when the distributor continued to supply out-of-date beers to retailers. New
York's state franchise laws governed the means by which Brooklyn Brewery could cancel,
despite the clear terms of the contract that stated the contract could be voided "with or without
cause").
72. Jacob E. Burgdorf, Essays on Mandated Vertical Restraints 6 (May 2016)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clemson University).

73.

See S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 61-4-1100

(Supp. 2014).
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while also hindering market competition by ensuring that distributors will
not compete within a given territory. 74 South Carolina's beer franchise laws,
along with the franchise laws of thirty-seven other states, give distributors
exclusive distribution rights to the producer's product in that territory.7 5
Steve Hindy, founder and president of Brooklyn Brewery in New York,
noted the debilitating effect that mandated exclusive territory laws can have
on independent breweries, particularly the smallest in the industry. 76
Because franchise laws make it difficult for a small brewer to get out of a
contractual relationship, as discussed above, and because a single distributor
has the exclusive right to sell that brewer's beer within a particular territory,
Hindy argues that small producers have no control over how their product is
sold. 7 7 Distributors can choose to market certain beers from particular
brands, while others "sit in their warehouses."17 Some small producers even
refuse to enter certain markets because of the reputation of local
distributors. 79 Once again, brewers are left with no recourse but to sue, an
option too costly for many small producers. Mandated exclusive territories
remain the most common area of criticism in the industry, with the majority
of brewers supporting change.
Studies into the economic effects of mandated exclusive territories,
however, have been largely mixed. While the voluntary use of exclusive
territories has been shown to reduce competitionso or prevent entry,8' other
studies have found that it aligned incentives between producer and
distributor and prevented distributors from free-riding on the efforts of
distributors in the same territory.8 2 Analysis into the effects of mandated
exclusive territories has proved even more challenging. Examined
empirically, studies have found that mandated exclusive territories have the

74. See Hindy, supra note 51.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id. ("The contracts not only prevent other companies from distributing a
company's beers, but also give the distributor virtual carte blanche to decide how the beer is
sold and placed in stores and bars-in essence, the distributor owns the brand inside that
state.").
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See generally Patrick Rey & Joseph Stiglitz, The Role of Exclusive Territories in
Producers' Competition, 26 RAND J. ECON. 431 (1995) (studying the effect of exclusive
territories in producers' competition).
81. See John Asker & Heski Bar-Isaac, Raising Retailers'Profits: On Vertical Practices
and the Exclusion ofRivals, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 672, 672-86 (2014).
82. See generally Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical Restraints as Contract
Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265-97 (1988) (examining the vertical
restraints as contract enforcement mechanisms).
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effect of increasing prices,83 although other studies suggest that the increase
in price is accompanied by an increase in quality.8 4 With respect to craft
breweries in South Carolina, Burgdorf found that the use of mandated
exclusive territories has exclusively negative effects, decreasing the entry of
breweries to the market and increasing prices."
The Brewers Association advocates for an exception to state franchise
laws, similar to that which exists in New York, based on a percentage of
distributor business:
[The Brewers Association] believes that small brewers and
wholesalers should be free to establish enforceable contracts
between the parties that both parties agree are fair and equitable.
Franchise laws were enacted to protect wholesalers from the undue
bargaining power of their largest suppliers. Applying those laws to
the relationship between a small brewer and the wholesaler is unfair
and against free market principles. Where franchise laws exist, the
BA believes that any brewer contributing a small percentage of a
wholesaler's volume should be exempted from those laws and free
to establish a mutually beneficial contract with that wholesaler.
Without the leverage inherent in being a large part of a wholesaler's
business, a small brewer and wholesaler can negotiate a fair contract
at arm's length. 86
C. Recent Changes in Beer Regulation
After the implementation of South Carolina's franchise laws in 1976,
regulation policy stagnated for nearly two decades. In 1996, as craft beer just
began its climb in popularity in the southern United States, the South
Carolina legislature passed the "brewpub law," which allows for a narrowlytailored circumvention of the three-tier system. 7 Under the law, a small
producer that qualifies as a "brewpub" may sell its beer directly to

83. See generally W. John Jordan & Bruce L. Jaffee, Use of Exclusive Territories in the
Distribution of Beer: Theoretical and Empirical Observations, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 137
(1987).
84. See generally Tim R. Sass & David S. Saurman, Mandated Exclusive Territories:
Efficiency, Effects and Regulatory Selection Bias, in 10 ADVANCES IN APPLIED
MICROECONOMICS 55, 55-72 (2001).

85. See Burgdorf, supra note 72, at 7.
86. BA Position Statements: Three-Tier Beer Distribution,BREWERS Ass'N, https://
www.brewersassociation.org/government-affairs/ba-position-statements/ (last visited Feb. 6,
2018).
87. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 61-4-1700 to -70 (2009 & Supp. 2017).
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consumers on-site, thereby bypassing the distribution tier." The law applies
to very small producers: a "'[b]rewpub' means a tavern, public house,
restaurant, or hotel which produces on the permitted premises a maximum of
two thousand barrels a year of beer for sale on the premises." 8 9 A qualified
brewpub may (1) produce up to two thousand barrels of beer a year for onsite consumption and to-go sale; (2) sell beer from other producers, which
has gone through a distributor in compliance with the three-tier system; and
(3) serve food and (if food is served) liquor. 90 Importantly, this law allows
for a brewpub producer to act as a quasi-retailer and sell beer from other
producers. 91
Unfortunately, the brewpub designation remained all-or-nothing: a
small-scale producer could sell its own beer to customers directly on-site as
a brewpub or to distributors for off-premises retail as a producer within the
three-tier framework, but not both.92 A brewpub in South Carolina also
cannot attend special events, like beer festivals or charity events. 93
Currently, twenty producers of beer in South Carolina legally operate under
the brewpub designation, all of which legally operate as fully functioning
restaurants while producing beer and possessing the option to offer beer for
retail. 94 While a narrow exception to the traditional framework of state
alcohol regulation, the brewpub law continues to have significant effects and
marked a watershed moment in the history of progressive alcohol legislation
for the state.
Since the brewpub law, South Carolina has passed several other notable
pieces of legislation which have helped to spur growth in the craft beer
industry. In 2010, South Carolina enacted two laws that permitted breweries
to offer on-site beer tastings 95 and allowed licensed retailers to offer the
same. 96 After these laws passed, a producer could offer two- to four-ounce
tastings of its beer as a compliment to a brewery tour, at a cap of sixteen

88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1720 (2017).
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1700(1) (2009).
90. Id. § 61-4-1740.
91. See id. § 61-4-1740(2).
92. Because a producer must obtain a license to operate as a brewpub, he is confined to
the activities permitted by the brewpub law; he may not obtain a brewpub license and a
brewery license simultaneously. See id. § 61-4-1720.
93. See Brook Bristow, Your Special Event Is Probably Illegal Now, BEER OF SC (June
28, 2016), https://beerofsc.com/2016/06/28/your-special-event-is-probably-illegal-now/.
94. See Brook Bristow, Breweries, Brewpubs, Contract, & Alt Props, BEER OF SC,
https://beerofsc.com/breweries/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
95. See H.R. 4572, 2009-2010 Gen. Assemb., 118th Sess. (S.C. 2010) (previously
codified as S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(A) (2012)).
96. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-960(A) (Supp. 2017).
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ounces a consumer. 97 Additionally, the law allowed a producer to sell up to
288 ounces of canned or bottled beer (the equivalent of twenty-four twelveounce cans) on-site for off-site consumption.9 8
This small but progressive step in the right direction was followed by a
giant leap for the South Carolina craft brewing industry: the "Pint Law" of
2013.99 The Pint Law, for the first time, allowed producers to sell up to four
pints, or forty-eight ounces, of on-premises beer per customer per day, again
in conjunction with a tour. ' The law had no effect on the sale of to-go beer,
which remained capped at 288 ounces.' 0 ' While seemingly narrow in scope,
effectively replacing the two- and four-ounce permitted samples with
twelve-ounce drinks, the Pint Law had the effect of shifting the business of a
South Carolina brewery from strictly production-focused to hospitalityfocused as well, allowing breweries to realize direct economic success from
consumers.102 The Pint Law's effects were felt immediately and met with
enthusiasm by brewers and patrons alike.1 03 Importantly, the Pint Law does
not apply to retailers, whose tastings must still comply with South Carolina
Code section 61-4-960, which contains rigorous limitations, including that
ten days prior to a tasting a retailer must give notice to the State Law
Enforcement Division1 04 and that no one retailer location may offer more
than twenty-four beer tastings in a given year, for example. 05
Just over a year later, South Carolina brewery owners toasted another
victory as then-Governor Haley signed the "Stone Bill"1 06 into law on June

97. Id.
98. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(E) (Supp. 2017).
99. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(A) (2017).
100. See id.
101. Id. § 61-4-1515(E).
102. For insight into the economic effects of the Pint Law for the craft beer industry in
South Carolina, see Brook Bristow, New Economic Impact Data from the South Carolina
Brewers Guild Shows More Growth, BEER OF SC (Dec. 10, 2014), https://beerofsc.com/2014/
12/10/new-economic-impact-data-from-the-south-carolina-brewers-guild-shows-more-growth/
(concluding that the Pint Law not only brought about economic success for existing breweries,
but also helped to fuel an influx of new brewery openings throughout the state to the benefit of
the overall state economy).
103. Westbrook Interview, supra note 37 ("The Pint Law made tap rooms [located on
breweries premises] successful in a way that they could never have been previously."); see
also Tug Baker, Changes in State Law Fueled S.C.'s Brewery Boom, FREE TIMES (Jan. 15,
2014), https://www.free-times.com/coverstory/changes-in-state-law-fueled-s-c-s-breweryboom/article_6c9e38a2-8b45-5662-bel0-a633b2ed2fl5.html (gathering opinions from local
brewers, patrons, and those in the legal field on the impact of the Pint Law).
104. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-960(A)(1) (Supp. 2017).
105. See id. § 61-4-960(A).
106. The bill was called the "Stone Bill" because it was motivated by a desire to entice
Stone Brewing Company of San Diego to open a South Carolina location, an option the
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2, 2014. The Stone Bill, now codified as section 61-4-1515(B) of the South
Carolina Code, permits a brewery to sell food on-premises, provided that it
obtains a permit from the Department of Health and Environmental Control
(DHEC).o 7 Although a seemingly minor change, the law had major
implications. For one, a brewery that sold food under the necessary license
was no longer regulated by the Pint Law as to how much beer it could sell
on-site.o10 Instead, under the Stone Law, breweries were to be indirectly
regulated by typical dram shop liability considerations.1 09 Additionally, a
brewery that qualified could apply for a permit that allowed it to sell beer
and wine not produced on-site, given that it was obtained through the threetier system.110 Thus, breweries can now sell food on-site, offer beer to
customers with no governmental regulations on the amount per customer,
and continue to get their beer to retail markets through the traditional threetier system. However, under the Stone Law, a brewery still could not serve
liquor. " Brewers have met the law and its effects with enthusiasm. 112
Even after the Stone Law, some difficulty for South Carolina brewers
remained. Despite the net positive effect of the three-tier system, as well as
its successful exceptions discussed previously, the system's rigidity
combined with its numerous, highly specific exceptions constructed a
confusing legal regime that proved, in some instances, difficult to navigate.
The imperfections of the regime are exemplified by a case recently in front
of the South Carolina Administrative Law Court.11 3 There, Hunter-Gatherer,

California brewer seriously considered. Although Stone settled elsewhere, the resulting law
had a monumental effect on the craft beer industry in South Carolina. For a full discussion of
the Stone Bill and its subsequent effect on South Carolina's craft brewing industry, see T.A.C.
Hargrove II, Stone Didn't Come, but We Got the Bill: An Analysis of South CarolinaLaws
Affecting Craft Brewers, 9 CHARLESTON L. REv. 335 (2015) (discussing the Stone Law's
arrival in South Carolina, as well as providing a legal analysis of the then-current legal
regulation of beer in South Carolina within the three-tiered framework).
107. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(B)(1) (Supp. 2014).
108. See id. ("In addition to the sales provisions set forth in [The Pint Law], a brewery
[is] permitted in this State . . . .").
109. For South Carolina's version of dram shop liability laws, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 616-2220 (2009).
110. Id. § 61-4-1515(B)(1).
111. See id. § 61-4-1515(B); see also Brook Bristow, The Brewpub Bill What It Does
and Why Your Favorite Pub Might Be Changing, BEER OF SC (Mar. 27, 2017),
https://beerofsc.com/2017/03/27/the-brewpub-bill-why-your-favorite-watering-hole-might-bechanging/ ("Breweries can't sell liquor, even with the new allowance for food sales under the
Stone Law like a restaurant would be able to do.").
112. Westbrook Interview, supra note 37 (commenting that the law has helped to
generate business and noting that compliance with the law's requirements is relatively easy).
113. See Hunter-Gatherer, LLC v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 16-ALJ-17-0031-CC, 2016
WL 2619600, at *1 (S.C. Admin. Ct. May 2, 2016).
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a popular brewpub in Columbia, South Carolina, that emerged as a result of
the original brewpub exception,11 4 applied to DOR for permits to open a new
brewery." Hunter-Gatherer looked to take advantage of the new Stone Law
by expanding and opening a second location, this time as a brewery, which
would allow the producer access to widespread distribution of its beer.116
DOR denied Hunter-Gatherer the requested permits, concluding that as a
brewpub, Hunter-Gatherer was a retailer in the eyes of the law and therefore
could not operate on the production tier as a brewery." 7 A creature of legal
fiction, the brewpub had not previously been defined as belonging to any
one tier. In the DOR's denial of Hunter-Gatherer's permit requests, it
asserted that brewpubs operated on the retail tier. 118 Hunter-Gatherer argued
instead that brewpubs are hybrid operations that straddled the line between
producer and retailer.119
The administrative law court agreed with Hunter-Gatherer, finding that
a brewpub license was a hybrid license that existed outside of the three-tier
system. 120 Relying on the Geathers' treatise, 121 the administrative law court
concluded that "the clear purpose [of the brewpub legislation] is to foster the
growth of brewpubs by allowing them to lawfully engage in both
manufacturing and retail activity which might otherwise run afoul of the
state's three-tier statute."1 22 The court was explicit in its holding that a
brewpub does not belong to, and therefore is not confined by, the constraints
of any one tier: "Brewpubs constitute an exception allowing one to
essentially straddle two tiers, rather than identifying themselves with any
one tier."1 23 While DOR contended that exceptions to the three-tier system
still exist within its framework, the court opined that the brewpub exception
exists entirely outside the three-tier system relying on the language of
section 61-4-1515(D)(5), which states: "Changes to the brewery laws
pursuant to subsection (B) and [the brewpub exception] do not alter or
amend the structure of the three-tier laws of this State, and the wholesalers
and the breweries must not discriminate in pricing at the producer or
wholesaler levels."1 24 Thus, the court reversed DOR's denial of Hunter-

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
See id.
See id.
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *6; THE GEATHERS' TREATISE, supra note 8, is also relied upon by this Note.
Hunter-Gatherer,2016 WL 2619600, at *6.
Id. at *7.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(D)(5) (Supp. 2014).
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Gatherer's permit requests, thereby allowing it to operate a brewpub and
brewery simultaneously. 2 5 Under the court's holding, the owner of a
brewpub could also likely hold ownership in a retail establishment.' 2 6 DOR
appealed the decision to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, but both
parties agreed to voluntarily dismiss the case after a new law made the
outcome moot.1 27

Two new laws have made a potential court of appeals review largely
moot. Even in the face of Hunter-Gatherer's victory in the administrative
law court, owners of brewpubs faced two significant legal frustrations: first,
beer produced by brewpubs could not be sold (or given away) at special
events, and second, beer produced by brewpubs could not reach retailers
through the three-tier system. 128 Recently, the South Carolina legislature
passed a pair of laws that afford brewpubs more options. Senate Bill 114,
signed into law May 19, 2017, allows producers, distributors, as well as
brewpubs to donate their products for sale and on-premises consumption to
licensed special events hosted by nonprofit organizations.1 29 Signed into law
the same day, Senate Bill 275, codified at section 61-4-1515(F) of the South
Carolina Code, allows the owner of a brewpub to relinquish his or her
license as such and obtain a brewery license. 3 0 Importantly, the bill also
amended the regulations that pertain to licensed breweries, so that brewery
owners may now apply for a license to sell liquor "for on-premises
consumption within a specified area of its licensed or permitted premises
physically partitioned from the brewing operation and designated for the
purpose of engaging substantially and primarily in the preparation and
serving of meals."' 3 ' Under the legal designation of brewery, a former
brewpub would have all the legal benefits of a brewery, including the right
to attend festivals and, more importantly, to distribute its product through the
three-tier system. 132 Because the law allows for a brewery to obtain a liquor

125. Hunter-Gatherer,2016 WL 2619600, at *8.
126. Given that the administrative law court considers a brewpub to be an exception to
the three-tier framework and exempt from a tier designation, and given that the court allowed
Hunter-Gatherer to simultaneously act as a brewpub and producer, it follows that the court
would likely allow a brewpub owner to also operate as a retailer.
127. Hunter-Gatherer,2016 WL 2619600, at *8.
128. See Bristow, supra note 102 ("Time and time again, the biggest complaint I hear
from brewpub clients is the inability to sell their beer beyond their four walls-mainly to a
wholesaler to distribute for you to buy from retailers or to serve beer at a festival to promote
themselves.").
129. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-2-185(D) (Supp. 2017).
130. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(F) (Supp. 2017).
131. Id. § 61-4-1515(B)(2).
132. See id. § 61-4-1515.
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license, a converted brewpub could maintain its ability to sell liquor after
converting to a brewery. Therefore, the new law resolves the brewpub law's
all-or-nothing difficulty. A brewpub that converts to a brewery could
continue to function as a brewpub while being legally designated as a
brewery, thus not being relegated to the 2,000-barrel-a-year production
ceiling while being able to distribute its beer through the three-tier system.
However, the brewpub conversion law did not resolve all the issues
plaguing brewpub owners. Even given the significant benefits of converting
from a brewpub to a brewery, producers are left with an interesting choice of
whether to hold a permit as a brewery or as a brewpub. After the Stone Law,
discussed supra, operating as a brewery would allow a producer to sell food,
produce beer with no production cap, get beer to retailers through the threetier system, offer to-go beer with a 288-ounce cap, and sell outside beer and
wine.' 3 3 And, with the recent addition of section 61-4-1515(B)(2), operating
an establishment under the brewery designation would allow for the sale of
liquor as well.' 3 4 On the other hand, a brewpub is not subject to any limit on
to-go beer, unlike a brewery. 3 5 Additionally, since brewpubs are considered
hybrids that exist outside of the three-tier system, owners of a brewpub may
own a retail space, such as a bottle shop or restaurant without violating
South Carolina's tied-house law. A brewery, however, fits squarely in the
production tier and is therefore subject to South Carolina's tied-house
statute, which prohibits ownership across tiers. 136
These are significant factors that must be considered for brewpub
owners. For example, a restaurant that operates as a brewpub might remain
under the legal designation of brewpub, rather than converting to a brewery,
so that it could continue to own and operate a bottle shop it also owns,
without violating the tied-house statute. Such a decision would come at the
price of remaining subject to the law's prohibition on brewpubs getting their
beer to retailers through the three-tier system. It seems likely that if such a
restaurant were to utilize the brewpub conversion law and convert to a
brewery, becoming legally a member of the production tier, its ownership
interest in any retail location would violate South Carolina's tied-house
statute.

133. See supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text (discussing the Stone Law and its
effects).
134. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(B)(2) (Supp. 2017).
135. See Bristow, supra note 102 ("[Under the Stone Law] breweries still have a cap of
288 ounces per day of beer to go.").
136. See discussion supra p. 11 (regarding South Carolina's tied-house statute); see also
S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-940(D) (Supp. 2014).
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Despite these recent steps forward, the legal system that governs the
craft beer industry still includes a number of antiquated laws, the defining
purposes of which have long left the public consciousness. While laws like
South Carolina's tied-house statute provide a necessary barrier that prevents
large-scale producers from vertically integrating and thus inhibiting market
competition, the law serves no purpose when it is applied to small-scale
producers, who make up the vast majority of brewers. Therefore, South
Carolina should carve out exceptions to laws like the tied-house statute
whose purpose only applies effectively to large-scale producers. An
exception to the tied-house statute based on yearly production, for example,
would allow a small brewery to own a small bottle shop. Such an exception
would allow small producers greater access to market, by allowing selfretail. At the time these laws were passed, they applied to all producers,
reflecting the anti-alcohol sentiments of the era in which they were
developed. Today, the craft beer industry is defined by passionate artisan
producers and a mainstream, productive customer base that favors quality
over quantity.
D. State Taxation ofBeer
Tax is the most expensive ingredient in your beer. 137 Beer, because of
its previously discussed unpopular past, is taxed seventy percent higher than
the average product on the market.' 38 A recent economic study found that
taxes, levied on all three tiers of the industry, amount to over forty percent of
the retail price consumers pay for beer. 139 Additionally, taxes on the
production and distribution of beer are included in the price used to compute
sales taxes, forcing the consumer to, in essence, pay a tax on a tax.1 40 All
fifty states and the District of Columbia impose some tax on beer above and

137. BEER INST., BEER TAX FACTS: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIETAL IMPACTS OF STATE
AND FEDERAL TAXES ON BEER 2 (2014), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/medme/doc/
Beer%20Institue%204.pdf [hereinafter BEER INSTITUTE TAX REPORT]; see also BEER INST.,
BEER SERVES AMERICA: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE BEER INDUSTRY (2014), http://mnbwa.

com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Output-Tax-State.pdf
138. BEER INSTITUTE TAX REPORT, supra note 137, at 2.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 5 ("First, the excise tax on beer is levied, by law, at the brewery and becomes
an indistinguishable part of the product cost as it moves through the distribution system. Like
other costs, it is marked up by wholesalers and again by retailers. It is also included in the
price used to compute state and local sales taxes, thus causing consumers to pay a tax on a tax.
As a result, beer drinkers actually end up paying about $2.00 out-of-pocket for each $1.00 of
tax levied by government.").
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beyond the general sales tax, called an excise tax.141 South Carolina claims
the nation's seventh highest excise tax on beer, at $0.77 taxed on every
gallon of beer.1 42 South Carolina's excise tax applies to each sale of beer,
regardless of tier: for example, a brewpub must pay the excise tax when its
beer is sold directly to consumers.1 43 Even though the Pint and Stone Laws
currently allow South Carolina brewers to sell beer directly to consumers,
breweries must still pay excise taxes on that beer which bypasses the threetier system. 144 While the state and federal government both impose taxes,
this Note will focus on the efforts South Carolina could make in scaling back
state taxes.
Not unlike other areas of alcohol regulation, government agencies cite
the negative influence of alcohol on the community as justification for such
weighty taxation. 14 One such justification is the "social cost" that problem
drinkers impose on society; the Center for Disease Control (CDC) released a
government-sponsored study which claimed that problem drinkers cost the
United States $223.5 billion a year.1 46 Reviewers have found this study
problematic. 147 Lawmakers also justify the high rate of taxation as an effort
to curb alcohol abuse, although some doubt the causation of such logic.1 48 In
fact, the Supreme Court has noted that "the evidence suggests that the
abusive drinker will probably not be deterred by a marginal price increase,
and that the true alcoholic may simply reduce his purchases of other
necessities."1 49

High taxation rates on beer have serious consequences for the industry.
State tax increases have a direct correlation on job loss in the beer industry,
and consumers buying across state lines for cheaper, less tax-burdened beer
can exacerbate that issue. 150 Since most of the taxes on beer are "hidden
taxes" (i.e., those that are incorporated into the price the consumer sees on
the shelf rather than the one they see tacked onto their total on the receipt),

141. See Scott Drenkard, How High Are Beer Taxes in Your State?, TAX FOUND. (Mar.
17, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/how-high-are-beer-taxes-your-state-0/.
142. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-1020 (2012).
143. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-1035(A) (2014).
144. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1515(A)(6) (2017).
145. BEER INSTITUTE TAX REPORT, supra note 137, at 6.
146. Id.
147. See id. ("[The results of the CDC's study are] a far cry from the $12 billion
estimated by independent economists . . . and is simply the latest in a long series of such
government-funded studies reporting higher and higher estimates over the last two decadesdespite the fact that the major empirical indicators of alcohol abuse, drunk driving, and
underage drinking have all greatly declined over this time period.").
148. See id. at 8.
149. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 506 (1996).
150. BEER INSTITUTE TAX REPORT, supra note 137, at 4.
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consumers are likely to believe craft beer is a more expensive product than it
would otherwise be.' But high beer taxes affect more than just those in the
industry. These taxes disparately affect the middle and lower classes over
the rich. 5 2 In fact, studies have found that the beer tax is one of the most
discriminatory in the nation, as households with yearly incomes of $50,000
or less pay nearly half of all beer tax funds.1 53 Finally, studies have found
the excise tax on beer to be an inefficient means of raising revenue.1 54 Thus,
South Carolina's tax policy should more accurately reflect societal attitudes
regarding beer, and the excise tax on beer should be eliminated or vastly
reduced.
III. REGULATION OF THE CRAFT BEER INDUSTRY IN NORTH CAROLINA AND
GEORGIA

Likely due to the big-city markets of Charlotte and Atlanta, North
Carolina and Georgia both have considerably larger craft beer industries
than that of South Carolina; the industry in each state had well over a billion
dollar state economic impact in 2016.'15 Despite the disparity in market size,
comparisons between South Carolina and its neighbor states are helpful in
uncovering which recent changes have produced immediate effects for the
craft beer industry and which laws have been met with enthusiasm by
industry members. Given the surge of new breweries opening across the
nation,156 the industry is very active in effecting, calling for, and reacting to
legal change. In North Carolina, Georgia, and South Carolina, brewers,
wholesalers, and retailers have vocally advocated for, and responded to,
changes in each state's respective regulation scheme. Comparing these

151. See John Dunham & Assoc., Beer Serves America: Economic Impact of the Malt
Brewing Industry in 2014, http://mnbwa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Output-Tax-State
.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
152. BEER INSTITUTE TAX REPORT, supra note 137, at 3.

153. Id. (citing Andrew Chamberlain & Gerald Prante, Who Pays Taxes and Who
Receives Government Spending? An Analysis of Federal, State and Local Tax and Spending
Distributions,1991-2004, at 45 (Tax Found., Working Paper No. 1, 2007)).
154. Id. at 5.
155. Georgia Craft Beer Sales Statistics, 2016, BREWERS Ass'N, https://www.brewers
association.org/statistics/by-state/?state=GA (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (noting that the craft
beer industry had a $1.596 billion state impact in 2016); North Carolina Craft Beer Sales
Statistics, 2016, BREWERS Ass'N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/statistics/by-state/?state
=NC (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (noting that the craft beer industry had a $2 billion state
impact in 2016).
156. Historical U.S. Brewery Count, BREWERS Ass'N, https://www.brewersassociation
.org/statistics/number-of-breweries/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2017) (reporting the recent increase in
breweries and brewpubs around the country).
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reactions, as well as supporting data, helps illuminate which changes have
promoted growth within the craft beer industry.
A.

Beer Laws in North Carolinaand Georgia

Both North Carolina and Georgia operate under the three-tier
framework, in which a brewer must sell to a distributor, who can then sell to
a retailer, who can finally sell to the public. 5' 7 North Carolina has carved out
a few significant exceptions to the divorcement of producer, distributor, and
retailer. A brewer, holding a license as a producer, who produces less than
25,000 barrels a year may obtain a distributor license for the purpose of selfdistribution in North Carolina.'15 Recently, House Bill 500 included a
provision that would remove that production cap, allowing any producer to
self-distribute. That provision was subsequently removed from the bill.1 59 As
another exception to the three-tier system, North Carolina allows any
brewery to obtain a retailer license for the purpose of on-site sale of to-go
beer. 160 But North Carolina still has some restrictive adherence to the threetier system; like South Carolina,161 the state has its own version of a tiedhouse statute, with no exception that applies to small-scale brewers. 162
Similar to section 61-4-940 of the South Carolina Code, North Carolina law
goes as far as prohibiting a producer or distributor from lending or giving
any "money, service, equipment, furniture, fixtures or any other thing of
value" to the other. 163
Until recently, the Georgia beer industry operated under one of the
strictest three-tier systems in the country.1 64 Before September 1, 2017,
Georgia's three-tier system remained almost wholly intact,1 65 Subject to only
two limited exceptions: a brewpub exception in which a producer of beer
that also acts as a restaurant could sell its beer directly to consumers,1 66 and

157. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-1 100 to -19 (2011) (North Carolina three-tier laws);
see also GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-5-20 to -38 (2015) (Georgia three-tier laws).
158. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1 104(a)(8) (2011).
159. Self-Distribution and Franchise Provisions Stripped from NC Bill, BREWERS
Ass'N, https://www.brewersassociation.org/current-issues/self-distribution-and-franchise-prov
isions-stripped-from-nc-bill/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2017).
160. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1104(7) (2011).
161. S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-940(D) (2012).
162. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1 116(a) (2011).
163. Id. § 18B-1116(a)(3).
164. Before the recent passage of section 3-5-24.1, Georgia was one of two states left in
the nation that did not allow producers to sell beer directly to consumers (other than limited
tour-tasting exceptions). See GA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-24.1 (2017).
165. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-5-30 to -33 (2015).

166. See id. § 3-5-38.
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a disingenuous "brewery tour" exception in which a brewery could offer a
very limited amount of beer directly to a tour-goer for free, as an educational
aide to the tour on-site 67 or as a to-go souvenir of the same.1 68 In September
of 2017, however, Georgia General Statute section 3-5-24.1 went into effect,
allowing a producer of beer to sell directly to consumers for on-site and togo consumption. 169 While the statute labels itself as a "limited exception" to
Georgia's three-tier system, the law has brought about the most affecting
and producer-friendly change to the craft beer industry in the state since the
years following prohibition.1o The law sparked immediate changes in
Georgia breweries, who embraced the new policy by transforming breweries
into more consumer-friendly "hangouts."'17 Georgia also has its own tiedhouse statute, which, with similar language to those of its neighbors,
prohibits a producer from "enjoying ownership interest" in any business of a
distributor or retailer. 172
Like South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia each have their own
version of franchise laws. In North Carolina, franchise laws generally favor
the distributor over the producer, as is commonplace given the laws' origins;
however, North Carolina has carved out exceptions that favor small-scale
producers, restoring some ground in the balance of power for small brewers.
Generally, a producer's ability to terminate or fail to renew a contract with a
distributor requires ninety days' notice, a period of forty-five days in which
a distributor can cure, and "good cause" on the part of the producer.1 73
Immediate termination is only permitted upon the distributor's insolvency,
loss of license, conviction of a felony, fraudulent conduct in dealing with the

167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See GA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-24.1 (2017) ("A limited exception to the provisions of
this title providing a three-tier system for the distribution and sale of malt beverages shall exist
to the extent that the license to manufacture malt beverages in this state shall include the right
to sell up to 3,000 barrels of malt beverages per year produced at the brewer's licensed
premises to individuals . . . .").
170. See Reid Ramsay, Georgia's Beer Bill Now Law, BEER STREET J. (May 8, 2017),
http://beerstreetjournal.com/georgia-beer-bill-now-law/ (noting that several Georgia breweries
expanded tap lists, renovated facilities to better support "hangout" crowds, hired more
employees, expanded hours of operation, and even planned additional locations in response to
the new law).
171. See id.; see also Dave Eisenberg, Following Direct Sales Bill Georgia's Wild
Heaven Beer to Open Second Location, GOOD BEER HUNTING (Mar. 23, 2017), http://good
beerhunting.com/sightlines/2017/3/23/following-direct-sales-bill-georgias-wild-heaven-beer-to
-open-second-location.
172. GA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-32 (2015).
173. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1304 (2009) ("[A producer may not] alter in a material
way, terminate, fail to renew, or cause a wholesaler to resign from, a franchise agreement with
a wholesaler except for good cause and with the notice required by G.S. 18B- 1305.").
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brewer, failure to pay for delivered beer, or transfer of the business without
notice to the brewer.1 74 Absent one of these conditions precedent, a producer
must show "good cause" in order to terminate a contract, which the statute
explicitly notes does not include "[f]ailure of the [distributor] to meet
standards of operation or performance that have been imposed or revised
unilaterally by the [producer] . . . ." 175 Like in South Carolina, then, North
Carolina producers are susceptible to poor performance of the contract by
distributors with costly legal recourse being the only available remedy.
Unlike South Carolina, North Carolina has carved out an exception that
alleviates this concern for very small brewers: a brewery that produces fewer
than 25,000 barrels may terminate or fail to renew a franchise contract,
absent good cause, following the fifth business day after confirmed receipt
of written notice and payment of fair market value of the distribution
rights. 176 This exception effectively eliminates the problem that franchise
laws create for small brewers: the risk of becoming trapped in an ineffective
relationship with a distributor with no economically feasible way to cancel
the contract. The exception not only provides small brewers in North
Carolina with a fair and cost-efficient means of getting out of a bad contract,
but it also eliminates the negative race-to-the-bottom incentive structure
found in traditional beer franchise laws. In addition, the exception remains
narrow enough that the laws continue to serve their primary purpose of
protecting independent distributors from abuse by large-scale producers that
have considerable bargaining power advantage. The North Carolina smallbrewer exception to its franchise laws reflects the needs of the industry by
protecting against market abuses by large-scale producers while not
restraining the ability of small-scale producers to operate within the free
market. However, the exception is very narrow, and only the smallest
breweries satisfy the requirements of the exception. 177
Georgia's franchise laws are even more rigorous than those of South
Carolina 78 and include no small-producer exception akin to the one found in
North Carolina's franchise laws.1 79 Under Georgia law, producers may
terminate a contract with a distributor only after filing a termination notice
with the state, which must set forth specific reasons for the request.s0 After

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss4/3

§§

3-5-29 to

-

174. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1305(c) (2009).
175. Id. § 18B-1305(d).
176. Id. § 18B-1305(a)(1).
177. See id.
178. Compare S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1100 (2009), with GA. CODE ANN.
34(2015).
179. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-1305(a)(1) (2009).
180. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 560-2-5.10 (2017).
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the request is filed, the law gives both the distributor and the state thirty days
to object and request a hearing.' If no objection is filed, the termination
request becomes effective; if an objection is filed and a hearing is held, the
Georgia Department of Revenue has the ultimate authority to grant or deny
the termination request. 8 2 The law sets a high bar for contract termination,
listing acceptable reasons for a producer to terminate: "A [distributor's]
bankruptcy or serious financial instability"; "[a distributor's] repeated
violation of any provision of federal or state law or regulation"; and "[a
distributor's] failure to maintain sales volume of the Brand reasonably
consistent with sales volumes of other [distributors] of that Brand." 8 3 Like
the law in South Carolina, franchise laws in Georgia place heavy limitations
on a brewer's freedom of contract by requiring significant malfeasance on
the part of a distributor and by forcing a producer to endure a costly and
inefficient process before allowing that producer to terminate a contract with
its distributor.
B.

Taxation ofBeer in North Carolinaand Georgia

Georgia boasts the nation's fourth highest state excise tax on beer.18 4
For draft beer beer sold directly from a keg-state and local excise taxes
amount to over seventy cents per gallon sold.8 5 For packaged beer, sold in
bottles or cans, excise taxes in Georgia amount to one dollar and one cent
per gallon. 8 6 Unlike in South Carolina, excise taxes in Georgia are broken
up into two categories-state excise taxes and local gallonage taxes. 8 7 Like
in South Carolina, these taxes are "hidden taxes,"' the result of which, as
discussed supra, is that customers are unlikely to realize that the cost is the
result of tax. After the hidden taxes are applied, general sales taxes are
calculated and added to the final price at the same rate as the general retail
sales tax for other sales made in the state. 189
North Carolina's excise tax on beer is only a few cents short of South
Carolina's rate, at just over sixty-one cents.1 90 Beer in North Carolina is not
taxed beyond that by local or special taxes, aside from the general sales tax

18 1.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See id.
See id.
Id.
See Drenkard, supra note 141.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 3-5-60 (2015).
See id.
See id.
See Dunham & Assoc., supra note 151.
See id.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-113.80 (2009); see also Drenkard, supra note 141.
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on the retail level applicable to any other product sold in the state. Georgia,
North Carolina, and South Carolina each boast some of the highest beer
excise tax rates in the country.
IV. PROGRESSIVE POLICIES IN OTHER STATES

Around the country, lawmakers have taken note of the positive
economic impact of the craft beer industry and responded in the form of
legislation that has eased tax burdens, encouraged the industry's potential for
tourism, and eased the regulatory burdens on small-scale production.
In addition to North Carolina, several states have passed small-brewery
exceptions to traditional franchise laws, most of which have a higher limit
than North Carolina's 25,000-barrel-a-year limit. Arkansas, Colorado,
Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, and Washington all
provide small-brewer exceptions that exempt brewers producing less than a
certain barrelage per year from the state's franchise laws. 191 Some states,
like Washington,1 92 apply their exception to brewers producing as many as
200,000 barrels a year, while other states, like Utah,' 93 keep the exception
extremely narrow, applying to brewers who produce less than 6,000 barrels a
year. Other exceptions are more creative and more accurately adhere to the
purpose of franchise laws: in New York, for example, any brewery that
produces less than 300,000 barrels can terminate a franchise agreement with
a distributor without good cause and upon payment of fair compensation,
given that the brewer makes up less than three percent of the distributor's
annual business.1 94 Because this law only applies to a producer that has no
unfair bargaining advantage over its distributor, it best reflects the purpose
for which franchise laws were enacted.
While a number of states provide tax incentives specifically for craft
breweries, New York has passed legislation that provides incentives to craft
brewers through financial grant support and tax breaks. Noting the positive
economic impact of the craft beer industry on the state,1 95 New York
legislators passed laws in 2012 that provide refundable corporate franchise

191.
192.
193.
194.

See Sorini, supra note 52.
See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.126.020 (2014).
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 32B-1-102(105) (West 2012).
See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 55-c (LexisNexis 2016).

195. See New York State Senate, Press Release: Senate Passes Bills to Grow Craft
Brewing Industry in New York (June 18, 2012), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/senate-passes-bills-grow-craft-brewing-industry-new-york ("New York's craft breweries
create fantastic beer, but just as important, they have a strong and growing impact on our
economy because they create jobs, support agriculture and promote tourism.").
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and personal income tax credits for beer produced in New York 96 and
exempt "farm breweries"1 97 from burdensome tax filing requirements. 198In
2016, the state passed an additional credit for the craft beer industry, the
New York Alcoholic Production Credit, which effectively offsets the state
excise tax by offering up to $745,000 in tax credits at a certain rate per
gallon produced.' 99 Additionally, New York offers up to three million
dollars a year in grants to craft breweries in an effort to promote locally
made beer and cider.200 In 2016, the New York craft beer industry ranked
ninth among states in amount of craft beer produced, while having the fourth
largest economic impact on its state at $3.439 billion. 201 South Carolina
should emulate the progressive tax policy in New York with regard to smallscale producers of beer in recognition of the positive economic impact the
industry has on the state.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

While largely rooted in antiquated sentiments, the three-tier system in
South Carolina remains the craft industry's greatest defense against the
potential market dominance that vertical integration would offer for largescale producers. Given its modem purpose, South Carolina should provide
exceptions to the three-tier system's general framework for small-scale
producers. Passing an exception to the tied-house statute, for example,
would provide craft producers flexibility in getting their product to market,
while preserving the law's central purpose as a defense against the undue
influence and power concentration of large-scale producers.
The largest hindrance to success in the South Carolina craft beer
industry remains the franchise laws that regulate contracts between
producers and distributors. 202 While some South Carolina producers have
great relationships with their distributors, those producers consider
themselves lucky. A producer that contracts with a distributor is bound to

196. See N.Y. TAX L. § 37 (LexisNexis 2014).
197. N.Y. ALCO. BEv. CONT. LAW § 51-a (LexisNexis 2016) (A "Farm Brewery" is a
small producer that uses primarily local ingredients to brew between fifty (50) and seventyfive thousand (75,000) barrels a year.).
198. See N.Y. TAX L. § 1136 (LexisNexis 2014).
199. See N.Y. TAX L. §§ I101(b)(19); 1105-B; 1115(a)(12), (19), and (33); 1118(13)
(LexisNexis 2016).
200. See CraftBeverage Grant Program,N.Y. STATE BINDER (2016), https://esd.ny.gov/
craft-beverage-grant-program.
201. See New York Craft Beer Sales Statistics, 2016, BREWERS AsS'N, https://www.
brewersassociation.org/statistics/by-state/?state=NY (last visited Mar. 26, 2018).
202. See Westbrook Interview, supra note 37; see also Hindy, supra note 5 1.
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that contract until the distributor misperforms the contract egregiously
enough to warrant legal action. Working in tandem with franchise laws'
unwaivable contract provisions, mandated exclusive territory laws ensure
that distributors will not be motivated by competition within any given
territory. To cancel or fail to renew a contract, South Carolina producers
must still go through the expensive process of termination.203
Such restraint on the ability to contract goes against the fundamental
freedom that provides the basis of contract law as well as the principles of
free market capitalism. The climate that necessitated that laws apply to all
producers has long since subsided. Therefore, South Carolina should adopt a
franchise law exemption similar to those found in states like New York and
Washington for brewers that produce less than a certain number of barrels
per year. Importantly, the exemption would continue to protect independent
distributors that possess significantly less bargaining power in contracts with
large corporate suppliers. Thus, a small-producer franchise law exemption in
South Carolina would allow small brewers to contract fairly and hold
distributors accountable for proper execution of the contract without having
to expend significant time and resources, while continuing to protect
independent distributors from abuse in contractual relationships of unequal
bargaining power.
Finally, South Carolina should adopt incentivizing policies for the craft
beer industry akin to those of New York. The craft beer industry in South
Carolina had a $650 million impact on the state in 2016,204 and craft
breweries have provided a new tourism draw throughout the state. Policies
in New York have been met with enthusiasm by brewers throughout the
state and have encouraged activity in the local economy by promoting
locally-made and locally-sourced products. South Carolina should follow
suit to promote the further growth of the craft beer industry in the state.
VI. CONCLUSION

The century-old motivations which prompted the enactment of the laws
that today provide the foundation for craft beer regulation have all but left
the public consciousness. Threats of the amoral nature of alcohol and the
influence of organized crime networks, concerns that once defined alcohol
regulation, no longer play a major role in the public discourse. However,
while some purposes of these laws are undoubtedly obsolete, today, the laws
provide a different but vital purpose for the craft beer industry. The

203. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-1100(1)(b) (Supp. 2014).
204. S.C. 2016 Statistics, supra note 3.
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fundamental requirement of the three-tier system and central provisions of
franchise laws serve to ensure fair market competition by protecting small
brewers from the market domination of large-scale producers through
influence over retailers and vertical integration over all three tiers. These
prevailing purposes do not necessitate restraining free market principles for
craft producers, and exceptions that benefit small-scale producers would not
disturb those vital purposes. Therefore, South Carolina should continue to
regulate the alcohol industry through the current frameworks already in
place, while implementing exceptions for small-scale producers.
Wilson Daniel
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